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Abstract
The problem of secure distributed matrix multiplication (SDMM) studies the communication
efficiency of retrieving a sequence of desired L×M matrix productsAB = (A1B1,A2B2, · · · ,ASBS)
from N distributed servers where the constituent L ×K matrices A = (A1,A2, · · · ,AS) and
K ×M matrices B = (B1,B2, · · · ,BS) are stored in X-secure coded form, i.e., any group of
up to X colluding servers learn nothing about A,B. The rate of an SDMM scheme is defined
as the ratio of the number of bits of desired information that is retrieved, to the total number
of bits downloaded on average. The supremum of achievable rates is called the capacity of
SDMM. In this work we explore the capacity of SDMM, as well as several of its variants, e.g.,
where the user may already have either A or B available as side-information, and/or where the
security constraint for either A or B may be relaxed. As our main contribution, we obtain new
converse bounds, as well as new achievable schemes for various cases of SDMM, depending on
the L,K,M,N,X parameters, and identify parameter regimes where these bounds match. A
remarkable aspect of our upper bounds is a connection between SDMM and a form of private
information retrieval (PIR) problem, known as multi-message X-secure T -private information
retrieval (MM-XSTPIR). Notable features of our achievable schemes include the use of cross-
subspace alignment and a transformation argument that converts a scalar multiplication problem
into a scalar addition problem, allowing a surprisingly efficient solution.
1
1 Introduction
Distributed matrix multiplication is a key building block for a variety of applications that include
collaborative filtering, object recognition, sensing and data fusion, cloud computing, augmented
reality and machine learning. Coding techniques, such as Entangled Polynomial codes [1] and
PolyDot codes [2], have been shown to be capable of improving the efficiency of distributed matrix
multiplication. However, with the expanding scope of distributed computing applications, there
are mounting security concerns about sharing information with external servers. The problem of
secure distributed matrix multiplication (SDMM) is motivated by these security concerns.
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Figure 1: Various sources generate large amounts of data represented as matrices M1,M2, · · · , and store
it at N distributed servers in X-secure form, coded independently as M˜n
i
. Various authorized users access
these servers and retrieve products of their desired matrices based on the downloads that they request from all
N servers. Note that unlike PIR (private information retrieval) [3] problems there are no privacy constraints
in SDMM, so users can publicly announce which matrix products they wish to retrieve. The SDMM problem
minimizes the average size of the total download for a generic user whose desired matrices are labeled A,B.
As defined in this work, SDMM studies the communication efficiency of retrieving desired matrix
products from distributed servers where the constituent matrices are securely stored. Specifically,
supposeA = (A1,A2, · · · ,AS) andB = (B1,B2, · · · ,BS) are collections of independent L×M and
M ×K random matrices, respectively, over a (large) finite field Fq, that are stored across N servers
subject to an X-security guarantee, i.e., any colluding group of up to X servers can learn nothing
about the A and B matrices. A user wishes to retrieve AB = (A1B1,A2B2, · · · ,ASBS), where
each AsBs, s ∈ {1, 2, · · · , S} is an L×M matrix in Fq, while downloading as little information from
the N servers as possible. The rate of an SDMM scheme is defined as the ratio H(AB)/D, where
H(AB) is the number of bits of desired information that is retrieved, and D is the total number of
bits downloaded on average. The supremum of achievable rates is called the capacity of SDMM. In
this work we study the capacity of SDMM, as well as several of its variants, e.g., where the user may
already have either A or B available as side-information,1 and/or where the security constraint for
1The definition of rate takes into account the side-information available at the user. For example, say, the user
has B available as side-information, then the rate is defined as H(AB | B)/D.
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either A or B may be relaxed. As our main contribution, we obtain new converse bounds, as well
as new achievable schemes for various cases of SDMM, depending on the L,K,M,N,X parameters,
and identify parameter regimes where these bounds match. A notable aspect of our upper bounds
is a connection between SDMM and a form of private information retrieval (PIR) problem, known
as multi-message X-secure T -private information retrieval (MM-XSTPIR).2 Interesting features of
our achievable schemes include the idea of cross-subspace alignment that was introduced in [6] and
was recently applied to SDMM in [7], and a novel transformation argument that converts a scalar
multiplication problem into a scalar addition problem. The transformation allows a surprisingly3
efficient (and capacity optimal) solution for scalar multiplication, outer products of vectors, and
Hadamard products of matrices.
Information-theoretic study of SDMM was introduced recently in [8] under a closely related
model with a few subtle differences. It is assumed in [8] that the A,B matrices originate at the
user, who securely encodes and sends these matrices to N servers, and then from just the downloads
that he receives from the servers in return, the user is able to compute AB. The goal in [8], as in
this work, is to maximize the rate of SDMM, defined as H(AB)/D. The same model is also pursued
in [7]. However, certain aspects of the model appear inconsonant. For example, a key assumption
in [7, 8] is that the user must not use his prior knowledge of A,B and must decode AB only from
the downloads. Since the goal is to minimize the communication cost, and the user already knows
A,B, why not do the computation locally and avoid all communication entirely? Indeed, the
question is not merely philosophical, because as shown in this work, in some cases, the best scheme
even with the model of [7,8] turns out to be one that allows the user to retrieve both A,B from the
downloads, and then compute AB locally — something that could be done without the need for
any communication if indeed A,B originated at the user. On the other hand, the SDMM model
assumed in this work assumes that A,B do not both originate at the user,4 rather they are stored
securely and remotely at the N servers,5 thus eliminating this concern. Another difference between
our model of SDMM and the SDMM model of [7,8] is that the precise assumptions regarding matrix
dimensions L,K,M are left unclear in [7,8], indeed these dimensions do not appear in the capacity
results in [7,8]. Even if the matrix dimensions L,K,M are all assumed to be large, the assumptions
about the relative size of L,K,M are not specified. However, our model allows L,K,M to take
arbitrary values, including large values. As it turns out, our results reveal that the relative size of
L,K,M does matter. For example, capacity-achieving schemes for SDMM from [7, 8] fall short if
K/L < 1, and a converse bound for two-sided security that is derived in [7] is violated under certain
conditions as well (see discussion following Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 in this work). Indeed, we
find that in general the capacity depends on all matrix dimensions as well as the parameters N,X.
Another minor distinction between this work and [7, 8] is that we allow joint retrieval of a block
of S matrix products AB = (A1B1,A2B2, · · · ,ASBS) where S can be chosen arbitrarily by the
2Notably while the capacity of multi-message PIR has been explored in [4,5] and that of X-secure T -private PIR
has been explored in [6], to our knowledge there has been no prior work on MM-XSTPIR.
3The achieved rate exceeds an upper bound previously obtained in literature [7]. See the discussion following
Theorem 2.
4One of A,B may be available to the user as side-information in some variants of SDMM studied in this work.
5We envision that the matrices A and B comprise sensitive data that originates at other sources, and is securely
stored at the N servers. The communication cost of uploading the data to the servers is not a focus of this work,
because the upload requires communication between a different set of entities (sources and servers) with their own
separate communication channels and cost dynamics. Furthermore, if the data is of interest to many (authorized)
users who perform their desired computations, then the repeated cost of such downloads could very well outweigh
the one-time cost of uploading the secured data to the servers.
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coding scheme. On the other hand, [7, 8] assume one-shot matrix multiplication, corresponding to
S = 1. This leads to different approaches to achievable schemes. For example, while both this work
and [7] use cross-subspace alignment, we use it to code across S blocks while [7] relies on a matrix
partitioning approach.
Notations: For a positive integer N , [N ] stands for the set {1, 2, . . . , N}. The notation X[N ]
denotes the set {X1,X2, . . . ,XN}. For an index set I = {i1, i2, . . . , in}, XI denotes the set
{Xi1 ,Xi2 , . . . ,Xin}. We use the notation X ∼ Y to indicate that X and Y are identically dis-
tributed.
2 Problem Statement: SDMM
Let A = (A1,A2, · · · ,AS) represent S random matrices, chosen independently and uniformly
from all matrices over FL×Kq . Similarly, let B = (B1,B2, · · · ,BS) represent S random matrices,
chosen independently and uniformly from all matrices over FK×Mq . The user wishes to compute
the products AB = (A1B1,A2B2, · · · ,ASBS).
The independence between matrices A[S], B[S] is formalized as follows.
H(A,B) = H(A) +H(B) =
∑
s∈[S]
H(As) +
∑
s∈[S]
H(Bs). (1)
Since we are operating over Fq, let us express all entropies in base q units.
The A,B matrices are available at N servers with security levels XA,XB , respectively. This
means that any group of up to XA colluding servers can learn nothing about A matrices, and
any group of up to XB colluding servers can learn nothing about the B matrices.
6 Security is
achieved by coding according to secret sharing schemes that separately generate shares A˜ns , B˜
n
s
corresponding to each As,Bs, and make these shares
7 available to the nth server, for all n ∈ [N ].
The independence between these securely coded matrices is formalized as,
I(A, A˜
[N ]
[S] ;B, B˜
[N ]
[S] ) = 0, (2)
H
(
A˜
[N ]
[S] , B˜
[N ]
[S]
)
=
∑
s∈[S]
H(A˜[N ]s ) +
∑
s∈[S]
H(B˜[N ]s ). (3)
Each matrix must be recoverable from all its secret shares,
H(As | A˜
[N ]
s ) = 0, H(Bs | B˜
[N ]
s ) = 0, ∀s ∈ [S]. (4)
The A,B matrices must be perfectly secure from any set of secret shares that can be accessed by
a set of up to XA,XB colluding servers, respectively.
I
(
A; A˜X[S]
)
= 0, X ⊂ [N ], |X | = XA (5)
I
(
B; B˜X[S]
)
= 0, X ⊂ [N ], |X | = XB (6)
I(A,B; A˜X[S], B˜
X
[S]) = 0, X ⊂ [N ], |X | = min(XA,XB) (7)
6For the most part, we will focus on cases with XA, XB ∈ {0, X}, i.e., the security level can either be X > 0 or
zero, where a security level zero implies that there is no security constraint for that set of matrices.
7If XA = 0 then we could choose A˜
n
s = As. Similarly, if XB = 0, then it is possible to have B˜
n
s = Bs.
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In order to retrieve the products AB, from each server n ∈ [N ], the user downloads ∆n which is
function of A˜n[S], B˜
n
[S].
H
(
∆n | A˜
n
[S], B˜
n
[S]
)
= 0. (8)
The side-information available to the user apriori is denoted Ψ, which can be either theA matrices,
or the B matrices, or null (φ) if the user has no side-information. Given the downloads from all N
servers and the side-information, the user must be able to recover the matrix products AB.
H
(
AB | ∆[N ],Ψ
)
= 0. (9)
Let us define the rate of an SDMM scheme as follows.
R =
H(AB | Ψ)
D
(10)
where D is the average value (over all realizations of A,B matrices) of the total number of q-
ary symbols downloaded by the user from all N servers. In order to steer away from the field-
size concerns that are best left to coding-theoretic studies, we will only allow the field size to be
asymptotically large, i.e., q → ∞. The capacity of SDMM is the supremum of achievable rate
values over all SDMM schemes and over all S.
Remark: The goal of the SDMM problem is to design schemes to minimizeD. The normalization
factor H(AB | Ψ) is not particularly important since it does not depend on the scheme, it is simply
a baseline that is chosen to represent the average download needed from a centralized server that
directly sends AB to the user in the absence of security constraints. Other baselines, e.g., H(AB)
may be chosen instead as in [8], or one could equivalently formulate the problem directly as a
minimization of download cost D. We prefer the formulation as a rate maximization because it
allows a more direct connection to the capacity of PIR, one of the main themes of this work.
Finally, depending upon which matrices are secured and/or available as side-information, we
have the following versions of the SDMM problem.
SDMM version secure side-information Ψ capacity
SDMM(AB,φ) A,B φ C(AB,φ)
SDMM(AB,B) A,B B C(AB,B)
SDMM(B,φ) B φ C(B,φ)
SDMM(B,A) B A C(B,A)
SDMM(B,B) B B C(B,B)
(11)
Thus, the version of SDMM is indicated by the subscript which has two elements, the first rep-
resenting the matrices that are secured and the second representing the matrices available to the
user as side-information. Note that other cases, such as SDMM(AB,A), SDMM(A,φ), SDMM(A,A),
SDMM(A,B), are equivalent to, SDMM(AB,B), SDMM(B,φ), SDMM(B,B), SDMM(B,A), respectively,
by the inherent symmetry of the problem, leaving us with just the 5 cases tabulated above.
3 Results
3.1 A Connection between SDMM and MM-XSTPIR
Let us begin by identifying a connection between SDMM and multi-message X-secure T -private
information retrieval (MM-XSTPIR). We refer the reader to Appendix A for a formal definition of
MM-XSTPIR.
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Lemma 1. The following bounds apply.
K ≥M =⇒ max
(
C(AB,B), C(B,B), C(AB,φ), C(B,φ)
)
≤ CMM-XSTPIR(N,XA,XB ,K,M), (12)
K ≥ L =⇒ C(AB,φ) ≤ CMM-XSTPIR(N,XB ,XA,K,L), (13)
where CMM-XSTPIR(N,X, T,K,M) is the capacity of MM-XSTPIR with N servers, X-secure stor-
age and T -private queries, retrieving M out of K messages.
Proof. Let us first prove the bound in (12), by showing that when K ≥M , then any SDMM scheme
where the side-information available to the user is not8 A, and where XB 6= 0, automatically yields
an MM-XSTPIR(N,XA,XB ,K,M) scheme with the same rate, essentially by thinking of A as the
data and B as the query. Consider MM-XSTPIR with K independent messages, each of which
consists of L i.i.d. uniform symbols in Fq, say arranged in a column. For all k ∈ [K], arrange these
columns to form the matrix A1 so that the k
th column of A1 represents the k
th message. Let the
M desired message indices be represented by the corresponding columns of the K × K identity
matrix, and let these M columns be arranged to form the K ×M matrix B1. Note that retrieving
the matrix product A1B1 is identical to retrieving the M desired messages. Now any (XA,XB)
secure SDMM scheme with S = 1 that does not have A as side-information, conditioned on the
realizations A1 = A1,B1 = B1, yields an MM-XSTPIR scheme by treating A˜
n
1 as the XA-secure
data stored at the nth server and B˜n1 as the XB-private query sent by the user to the n
th server,
for all n ∈ [N ]. For arbitrary S > 1 we can simply extend the data by a factor of S, i.e., each
message is comprised of SL symbols, so that the kth message is represented by the kth columns
of A1, A2, · · · , AS , treated as realizations of A1,A2, · · · ,AS . Thus, conditioning on the realization
B1 = B2 = · · · = BS = B1 gives us the S-fold extension of the same scheme. Furthermore,
since B matrices are secure, i.e., XB > 0 for all SDMM settings that appear in (12), it follows
that B is independent of B˜n[S] for any n ∈ [N ]. This in turn implies that B is independent of the
download ∆n received from Server n. Therefore, conditioning on B taking values in the set that
corresponds to MM-XSTPIR (i.e., B1 restricted to any choice of M columns of the K ×K identity
matrix) does not affect the distribution of ∆n, or the entropy H(∆n). In other words, the average
download of the SDMM scheme remains unchanged as it is specialized to yield an MM-XSTPIR
scheme as described above. Now, since the number of desired q-ary symbols retrieved by this
feasible MM-XSTPIR scheme is SLM , the average download, D for the SDMM scheme cannot be
less than SLM/CMM-XSTPIR(N,XA,XB ,K,M). Therefore, we have a bound on the rate of the
8
A cannot be the side-information because as noted, the transformation from SDMM to MM-XSTPIR interprets
A as the data, which cannot be already available to the user in MM-XSTPIR. On the other hand, B may be included
in the side-information because it is interpreted as the queries, which are automatically known to the user in MM-
XSTPIR. Note that if B is also not included in the side-information, that just means that the user can retrieve AB
from the downloads without using the knowledge of B in the resulting MM-XSTPIR scheme.
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SDMM scheme as
R =
H(AB | B)
D
(14)
≤
H(AB)
D
(15)
≤
SLM
D
(16)
≤
SLM
SLM/CMM-XSTPIR(N,XA,XB ,K,M)
(17)
= CMM-XSTPIR(N,XA,XB ,K,M) (18)
In (15) we used the fact that conditioning reduces entropy so that H(AB | B) ≤ H(AB). In (16)
we used the fact that the matrix AB has SLM elements from Fq, and since the uniform distribution
maximizes entropy, H(AB) ≤ SLM . The bound in (13) is similarly shown, by treating B˜n1 as the
XA-secure data stored at the n
th server and A˜n1 as the XB-private query sent by the user to the
nth server. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
3.2 An Upperbound on the Capacity of MM-XSTPIR
Motivated by Lemma 1, an upper bound on the capacity of MM-XSTPIR is presented in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. The capacity of MM-XSTPIR is bounded as follows.
CMM-XSTPIR(N,X, T,K,M)
≤

0, N ≤ X,
M(N −X)
KN
, X < N ≤ X + T,
N −X
N
(
1 +
(
T
N −X
)
+ · · · +
(
T
N −X
)⌊K
M
⌋−1
)−1
, N > X + T.
(19)
The proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Appendix A.2. Note that Theorem 1 also works for
trivial security or privacy, i.e., when X = 0 or T = 0.
Remark: In fact a closer connection exists between SDMM and MM-XSTPC, i.e., multi-message
X-secure T -private (linear) computation problem that is an extension of the private computation
problem studied in [9]. However, we use only the connection to MM-XSTPIR because this setting
is simpler and the connection between SDMM and MM-XSTPIR suffices for our purpose .
3.3 Entropies of Products of Random Matrices
The following lemma is needed to evaluate the numerator in the rate expressions for SDMM schemes.
Lemma 2. Let A, B be random matrices independently and uniformly distributed over FL×Kq ,
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F
K×M
q , respectively. As q →∞, we have
H(AB) =
{
LM, K ≥ min(L,M)
LK +KM −K2, K < min(L,M)
, (20)
H(AB | A) = min(LM,KM), (21)
H(AB | B) = min(LM,LK), (22)
in q-ary units.
The proof of Lemma 2 appears in Appendix B.
We now proceed to capacity characterizations for the various SDMM models.
3.4 Capacity of SDMM(AB,φ)
Let us start with the basic SDMM setting, where both matrices A,B are X-secured, and there
is no prior side-information available to the user. This is essentially the two-sided secure SDMM
setting considered previously in [7, 8].
Theorem 2. The capacity of SDMM(AB,φ), with XA = XB = X, is characterized under various
settings as follows.
N ≤ X =⇒ C(AB,φ) = 0 (23)
N > X,K = 1 =⇒ C(AB,φ) = 1−
X
N
(24)
2X ≥ N > X,
K
min(L,M)
→∞ =⇒ C(AB,φ) = 0 (25)
N > 2X,
K
min(L,M)
→∞ =⇒ C(AB,φ) = 1−
2X
N
(26)
N > X,K ≤ min(L,M),
max(L,M)
K
→∞ =⇒ C(AB,φ) = 1−
X
N
(27)
N > X,
K
min(L,M)
< 1 =⇒ C(AB,φ) ≤ 1−
X
N
(28)
2X ≥ N > X,
K
min(L,M)
≥ 1 =⇒ C(AB,φ) ≤
(
1−
X
N
)
min(L,M)
K
(29)
N > 2X,
K
min(L,M)
≥ 1 =⇒ C(AB,φ) ≤
(
1−
X
N
)(
1 +
(
X
N −X
)
+ · · ·+
(
X
N −X
)⌊ K
min(L,M)
⌋−1
)−1
(30)
Case (23) is trivial because A,B are X-secure, and nothing is available to the user as side-
information, which means that even if the user and the servers fully combine their knowledge, A,B
remain a perfect secret. The converse proof for cases (24) and (27) of Theorem 2 is presented in
Section 4.2. Converse proofs for all other cases follow from Lemma 1 and Theorem 1. For example,
consider case (25). According to (12),(13), we have C(AB,φ) ≤ CMM-XSTPIR(N,X,X,K,min(L,M))
which in turn is bounded by min(L,M)(N − X)/(KN) according to Theorem 1. Therefore, if
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K/min(L,M) → ∞, then we have the bound C(AB,φ) = 0. Converse bounds for other cases are
found similarly. The proof of achievability for case (24) is presented in Section 5.4. All other
achievability results are presented in Section 5.3.5.
Remark: The capacity of 2-sided SDMM problem is characterized in [7] as
(
1− 2XN
)+
. Our ca-
pacity characterizations for cases (24) and (27) present a contradiction that calls into question9 the
converse bound in [7]. To further highlight the contradiction, note that in the SDMMAB,φ problem,
for arbitrary L,K,M , just by retrieving each of A,B separately using the scheme described in Sec-
tion 5.1, it is possible to achieve a rate equal to H(AB)(LK+KM)
(
1− XN
)
≥ min(LM,LK+KM−K
2)
(LK+KM)
(
1− XN
)
which can be larger than
(
1− 2XN
)+
. Since [7] assumes S = 1, consider for example, L = K =M ,
and N = X+1. Then with S = 1 this simple scheme achieves a rate 12
(
1− XN
)
= 12N which exceeds(
1− 2XN
)+
= 0 for all X > 1. On the other hand, the achievable scheme presented in [7] does not10
achieve the rate
(
1− 2XN
)+
when K < min(L,M), so it remains unknown if
(
1− 2XN
)+
is even a
lower bound on capacity in general.
Corollary 1. Consider a modification of the SDMM(AB,φ) problem, where instead of AB, the user
wants to retrieve the Hadamard product A ◦ B. The capacity of this problem, i.e., the supremum
of H(A ◦B)/D, as q →∞, is 1−X/N .
The converse for Corollary 1 follows directly from the converse proof of Theorem 2, case (24) in
Section 4.2 where we replace AB with A ◦B. On the other hand, since the Hadamard product is
the entrywise product of matrices, thus the scalar multiplication scheme presented in Section 5.4.1
achieves the capacity.
3.5 Capacity of SDMM(B,A)
The next SDMM model we consider corresponds to the one-sided SDMM problem considered in [8].
Recall that the one-sided security model in [8] assumes that one of the matrices is a constant matrix
known to everyone. This corresponds to the A matrix in our model of SDMM(B,A) because A is
not secured and is available to the user as side-information. Here our capacity result is consistent
with [8].
Theorem 3. The capacity of SDMM(B,A) with XA = 0,XB = X is
C(B,A) =

0, N ≤ X,
1−
X
N
, N > X.
(31)
Theorem 3 fully characterizes the capacity of SDMM(B,A). The converse for Theorem 3 follows
along the same lines as the converse presented in [8], but for the sake of completeness we present
the converse in Section 4.1. The proof of achievability provided in [8] is tight only11 if K ≥ L and
9The information provided by the genie to the user in the converse proof of [7] is subsequently considered useless
on the basis that it is independent of AB. However, it turns out this independent side-information can still be useful
in decoding AB, just as a noise term Z that is independent of AB can still be useful in decoding AB from the value
AB+ Z.
10This is becauseH(AB) 6= LM whenK < min(L,M). Instead, according to Lemma 2, H(AB) = LK+KM−M2.
So while the download for the scheme in [7] is LMN/(N−2X), the rate achieved whenK < min(L,M) isH(AB)/D =
LK+KM−K2
LM
(
1− 2X
N
)+
, which is strictly smaller than
(
1− 2X
N
)+
for K < min(L,M).
11 The achievable scheme for the one-sided secure setting in [8] always downloads NLM/(N −X) q-ary symbols,
whereas the capacity achieving scheme needs to download only NKM/(N −X) q-ary symbols when K < L.
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L is a multiple of N − X. Therefore, a complete proof of achievability is needed for Theorem 3.
Such a proof is presented in Section 5.3.1.
3.6 Capacity of SDMM(B,B)
Theorem 4. The capacity of SDMM(B,B), with XA = 0,XB = X, is characterized under various
settings as follows.
K ≤M =⇒ C(B,B) = 1 (32)
K > M,N ≤ X =⇒ C(B,B) =
M
K
(33)
N > X,
K
M
→∞ =⇒ C(B,B) = 1−
X
N
(34)
K > M,N > X =⇒ C(B,B) ≤
(
1 +
(
X
N
)
+ · · ·+
(
X
N
)⌊K
M
⌋−1
)−1
(35)
The converse for K ≤ M is trivial because the capacity by definition cannot exceed 1. The
converse for the remaining cases follows directly from Lemma 1 and Theorem 1. For example,
consider the case (33). According to Lemma 1, CB,B ≤ CMM-XSTPIR(N, 0,X,K,M) which is
bounded by M/K according to Theorem 1. Other cases follow similarly. The proof of achievability
for Theorem 4 is provided in Section 5.3.2.
3.7 Capacity of SDMM(B,φ)
Theorem 5. The capacity of SDMM(B,φ), with XA = 0,XB = X, is characterized under various
settings as follows.
N ≤ X =⇒ C(B,φ) = 0 (36)
K ≥ L,N > X =⇒ C(B,φ) =
(
1−
X
N
)
H(AB)
H(AB | A)
=
(
1−
X
N
)
(37)
K < L,N > X,
K
M
→∞ =⇒ C(B,φ) = 1−
X
N
(38)
K ≤M,N > X,
L
M
→∞ =⇒ C(B,φ) = 1 (39)
K < L,N > X,
M
L
→∞ =⇒ C(B,φ) =
(
1−
X
N
)
H(AB)
H(AB | A)
=
(
1−
X
N
)
(40)
L > K ≥M,N > X =⇒ C(B,φ) ≤
(
1 +
(
X
N
)
+ · · ·+
(
X
N
)⌊K
M
⌋−1
)−1
(41)
The case N ≤ X is trivial because B must be X-secure and there is no side-information at
the user, which means that neither the user, nor all servers together have any knowledge of B.
The converse for (37) and (40) follows from the fact that any SDMMB,φ scheme is also a valid
SDMMB,A scheme, so the download, say DB,φ for the best SDMMB,φ scheme cannot be less than
the download, say DB,A for the best SDMMB,A scheme. For (38) the converse follows directly
from Lemma 1 and Theorem 1. The converse for (39) is trivial because the capacity can never be
more than 1 by definition. Finally, the converse for (41) also follows from Lemma 1 and Theorem
1. The achievability results for Theorem 5 are proved in Section 5.3.3.
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3.8 Capacity of SDMMAB,B
Theorem 6. The capacity of SDMM(AB,B), with XA = XB = X, is characterized under various
settings as follows.
N ≤ X =⇒ C(AB,B) = 0 (42)
N > X,K ≤M =⇒ C(AB,B) = 1−
X
N
(43)
2X ≥ N > X,K > M =⇒ C(AB,B) =
M(N −X)
KN
(44)
N > 2X,K > M,
K
M
→∞ =⇒ C(AB,B) = 1−
2X
N
(45)
N > 2X,K > M =⇒ C(AB,B) ≤
N −X
N
(
1 +
(
X
N −X
)
+ · · · +
(
X
N −X
)⌊K
M
⌋−1
)−1
(46)
The case (42) with N ≤ X is trivial because the A is X-secure and not available to the user as
side-information, which means that it is unknown to both the user and all servers. The converse
for (43) follows from the observation that relaxing the security constraint for B cannot hurt, so
C(AB,B) is bounded above by C(A,B), which is equal to C(B,A) = 1 −
X
N by the symmetry of the
problem and the result of Theorem 3. The converse for (44), (45), (46) follows from Lemma 1 and
Theorem 1. The proof of achievability for Theorem 6 appears in Section 5.3.4.
4 Converse
4.1 Proof of Converse for Theorem 3
The case N ≤ X is trivial because B must be X-secure and not available to the user as side-
information, which means that neither the user, nor all servers together have any knowledge of B.
Now let us consider the case N > X. Let X denote any subset of [N ] such that |X | = X. We start
with the following lemma.
Lemma 3. I (∆X ;AB | A) = 0.
Proof.
I (∆X ;AB | A)
= H(∆X | A)−H (∆X | AB,A) (47)
≤ H(∆X | A)−H (∆X | A,B) (48)
= I (∆X ;B | A) (49)
≤ I
(
B˜X[S],A;B | A
)
(50)
≤ I
(
B˜X[S],A;B
)
(51)
= I
(
B˜X[S];B
)
+ I
(
A;B | B˜X[S]
)
(52)
≤ I
(
B˜X[S];B
)
+ I
(
A;B, B˜T[S]
)
(53)
= 0. (54)
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The steps in the proof are justified as follows. Step (47) applies the definition of mutual information.
Step (48) follows from the fact that (AB,A) is function of (A,B) and conditioning reduces entropy.
Step (49) applies the definition of mutual information, and (50) holds because ∆X is function of(
B˜T[S],A
)
. In (51), (52) and (53), we repeatedly used the chain rule and non-negativity of mutual
information. The last step follows from the security constraint defined in (6) and separate encoding
of matrices (2). The proof is completed by the non-negativity of mutual information.
The proof of converse of Theorem 3 is now presented as follows.
H (AB | A)
= H (AB | A)−H
(
AB|∆[N ],A
)
+H
(
AB | ∆[N ],A
)
(55)
= H (AB | A)−H
(
AB | ∆[N ],A
)
(56)
= I
(
AB;∆[N ] | A
)
(57)
= H(∆[N ] | A)−H
(
∆[N ] | AB,A
)
(58)
≤ H(∆[N ] | A)−H (∆X | AB,A) (59)
= H(∆[N ] | A)−H (∆X | A) . (60)
Steps are justified as follows. (55) subtracts and adds the same term so nothing changes. (56)
follows from the correctness constraint,(9). Steps (57) and (58) follow from the definition of mutual
information. In (59), we used the fact that dropping terms reduces entropy. The last step holds
from Lemma 3.
Averaging (60) over all choices of X and applying Han’s inequality (Theorem 17.6.1 in [10]), we
have
H (AB | A)
≤ H(∆[N ] | A)−
X
N
H
(
∆[N ] | A
)
(61)
=
(
1−
X
N
)
H(∆[N ]|A) (62)
≤
(
1−
X
N
)
H(∆[N ]) (63)
≤
(
1−
X
N
) ∑
n∈[N ]
H(∆n). (64)
Thus we obtain
CB,A = sup
H (AB | A)
D
(65)
≤ sup
H (AB | A)∑
n∈[N ]H(∆n)
(66)
≤ 1−
X
N
. (67)
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4.2 Converse of Theorem 2: (24),(27)
Let X denote any subset of [N ] such that |X | = X. The proof of converse is as follows.
H(AB)
= H(AB)−H
(
AB | ∆[N ]
)
+H
(
AB | ∆[N ]
)
(68)
= H(AB)−H
(
AB | ∆[N ]
)
(69)
= I
(
AB;∆[N ]
)
(70)
= H
(
∆[N ]
)
−H
(
∆[N ] | AB
)
(71)
≤ H(∆[N ])−H
(
∆[N ] | A,B
)
(72)
≤ H(∆[N ])−H (∆X | A,B) (73)
= H(∆[N ])−H (∆X ) . (74)
Steps are justified as follows. (68) subtracts and adds the same term so nothing changes. (69)
follows from (9), while (70) and (71) follow from the definition of mutual information. (72) holds
because adding conditioning reduces entropy and AB is function of (A,B). (73) holds because
dropping terms reduces entropy. The last step simply follows from the following fact,
0 = I(A,B; A˜X[S], B˜
X
[S]) (75)
= I(A,B;∆X ) (76)
= H(∆X )−H(∆X | A,B) (77)
where (75) is the security constraint defined in (7). (76) follows from non-negativity of mutual
information and the fact that ∆X is function of (A˜
X
[S], B˜
X
[S]). (77) is the definition of mutual
information.
Averaging (74) over all choices of X and applying Han’s inequality, we have
H (AB) ≤ H
(
∆[N ]
)
−
X
N
H
(
∆[N ]
)
(78)
=
(
1−
X
N
)
H
(
∆[N ]
)
(79)
≤
(
1−
X
N
) ∑
n∈[N ]
H(∆n). (80)
Thus we obtain
C(AB,φ) = sup
H(AB)
D
(81)
≤ sup
H(AB)∑
n∈[N ]H(∆n)
(82)
≤ 1−
X
N
. (83)
5 Achievability
Let us present two basic schemes that are essential ingredients of the proofs of achievability.
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5.1 A General Scheme
This scheme allows the user to retrieve all A,B, after which he can locally compute AB. Let
S = N − X, and let Zsx,Z
′
sx′ , s ∈ [S], x ∈ [XA], x
′ ∈ [XB ] be uniformly distributed random
matrices over FL×Kq and F
K×M
q respectively. Note that XA,XB ∈ {0,X}. The independence of
these random matrices and matrices A[S],B[S] is specified as follows.
H
(
(Zsx,Z
′
sx′)s∈[S],x∈[XA],x′∈[XB ],A[S],B[S]
)
=
∑
s∈[S],x∈[XA],x′∈[XB ]
H(Zsx) +H(Z
′
sx′) +
∑
s∈[S]
H(As) +H(Bs). (84)
Let αn, n ∈ [N ] be N distinct elements from Fq. The construction of securely encoded matrices A˜
n
s
and B˜ns for any s ∈ [S] and n ∈ [N ] is provided below.
A˜ns = α
s
nAs +
∑
x∈[XA]
αS+xn Zxt (85)
= αsnAs + α
S+1
n Zs1 + · · ·+ α
S+XA
n ZsXA (86)
B˜ns = α
s
nBs +
∑
x′∈[TB]
αS+x
′
n Z
′
sx′ (87)
= αsnBs + α
S+1
n Z
′
s1 + · · · + α
S+XB
n Z
′
sXB . (88)
The answer from the n-th server is specified as follows
∆n =
[
A˜n1 + · · ·+ A˜
n
S
B˜n1 + · · ·+ B˜
n
S
]
(89)
=
[
αnA1 + · · ·+ α
S
nAS + α
S+1
n
∑
s∈[S]Zs1 + · · ·+ α
S+XA
n
∑
s∈[S]ZsXA
αnB1 + · · ·+ α
S
nBS + α
S+1
n
∑
s∈[S]Z
′
s1 + · · ·+ α
S+XB
n
∑
s∈[S]Z
′
sXB
]
. (90)
Note that the desired matrices and the random matrices are coded with an RS code. Therefore,
from the answers provided by all N servers, the user is able to decode all matrices A[S],B[S],
and then determine AB = (As × Bs)s∈[S]. Note that XA-security is guaranteed for matrices As
because they are protected by the XA noise matrices Zsx, x ∈ [XA], that are i.i.d. uniform and
coded according to MDS(XA, N). Similarly, XB-security is guaranteed for matrices Bs.
5.2 Cross Subspace Alignment Based Scheme
For this scheme, let us set
S = N −XA −XB . (91)
And let Zsx,Z
′
sx′ , s ∈ [1 : S], x ∈ [TA], x
′ ∈ [TB ] be uniformly distributed random matrices over
F
L×K
q and F
K×M
q respectively. The independence of random matrices and matrices A[S],B[S] is
specified as follows.
H
(
(Zsx,Z
′
sx′)s∈[S],x∈[TA],x′∈[TB],A[S],B[S]
)
=
∑
s∈[S],x∈[XA]
H(Zsx) +
∑
s∈[S],x′∈[XB]
H(Z′sx′) +
∑
s∈[S]
H(As) +
∑
s∈[S]
H(Bs). (92)
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For the construction of this scheme, we will need S distinct constants fs ∈ Fq, s ∈ [S], and N
distinct constants αn, n ∈ [N ] that are elements of G,
G = {α ∈ Fq : α+ fs 6= 0,∀s ∈ [S]}. (93)
The securely encoded matrix A˜ns for any s ∈ [S] and n ∈ [N ] is provided below.
A˜ns = As +
∑
x∈[XA]
(fs + αn)
xZsx (94)
= As + (fs + αn)Zs1 + · · · + (fs + αn)
XAZsXA . (95)
Similarly, the securely encoded matrix B˜ns for any s ∈ [S] and n ∈ [N ] is as follows,
B˜ns =
1
fs + αn
Bs + ∑
x′∈[XB]
(fs + αn)
x′Z′sx′
 (96)
=
1
fs + αn
(
Bs + (fs + αn)Z
′
s1 + · · ·+ (fs + αn)
XBZ′sXB
)
. (97)
The download from any server n, n ∈ [N ] is constructed as follows.
∆n =
∑
s∈[S]
A˜ns B˜
n
s (98)
=
∑
s∈[S]
(
1
fs + αn
AsBs
)
+
∑
s∈[S]
∑
x∈[XA]
(fs + αn)
x−1ZsxBs
+
∑
s∈[S]
∑
x′∈[XB]
(fs + αn)
x′−1AsZ
′
sx′ +
∑
s∈[S]
∑
x∈[XA],x′∈[XB]
(fs + αn)
x+x′−1ZsxZ
′
sx′ . (99)
Each of the last three terms can be expanded into weighted sums of terms of the form αtn,
t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,XA +XB − 1}. Thus, upon receiving all N answers from servers, the user is able
to decode all S desired product matrices (As ×Bs)s∈[S], as long as the following N ×N matrix is
invertible,
MN =

1
f1+α1
· · · 1fS+α1 1 α1 · · · α
XA+XB−1
1
1
f1+α2
· · · 1fS+α2 1 α2 · · · α
XA+XB−1
2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
1
f1+αN
· · · 1fS+αN 1 αN · · · α
XA+XB−1
N
 , (100)
which is shown to be true by Lemma 11. The proof of Lemma 11, which is based on the proof of
Lemma 5 in [6], is presented in Appendix C. XA-security is guaranteed for matrices As because
they are protected by the XA noise matrices Zsx, x ∈ [XA], that are i.i.d. uniform and coded
according to MDS(XA, N) codes. XB-security is similarly guaranteed for the matrices Bs, s ∈ [S].
5.3 Proofs of Achievability
Throughout these proofs, we will allow q → ∞. Furthermore, we will use Lemma 2 to calculate
the entropy of random matrices.
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5.3.1 Achievability Proof of Theorem 3
First, let us consider the setting when K ≥ L. For this setting, let us apply the cross subspace
alignment based scheme presented in Section 5.2. Note that XA = 0,XB = X, and the total
number of downloaded q-ary symbols is NLM , so the rate achieved is
R =
H (AB | A)
NLM
(101)
=
SLM
NLM
(102)
= 1−
X
N
, (103)
which matches the capacity for this setting. On the other hand, when K < L, let us apply the
general scheme presented in Section 5.1. Since XA = 0,XB = X, we have
∆n =
[
αnA1 + · · ·+ α
S
nAS
αnB1 + · · ·+ α
S
nBS + α
S+1
n
∑
s∈[S]Z
′
s1 + · · ·+ α
S+X
n
∑
s∈[S]Z
′
sX
]
. (104)
But note that left matrices A[S] are already available to the user as side information, so it is not
necessary to download (αnA1 + · · · + α
S
nAS) terms. Therefore, the total number of downloaded
q-ary symbols is NKM , and the rate achieved is
R =
H (AB | A)
NKM
(105)
=
SKM
NKM
(106)
=1−
X
N
, (107)
which matches the capacity for this setting. This completes the achievability proof of Theorem 3.
5.3.2 Achievability Proof for Theorem 4
First consider the trivial scheme with S = 1 that downloads the matrices A[S] directly from any
one out of N servers, since there is no security constraint on these matrices (XA = 0). Since B[S]
is already available as side information, downloading A[S] allows the user to compute AB locally.
The rate achieved with this scheme is
R =
H (AB | B)
LK
(108)
=
min(LM,LK)
LK
(109)
=

1, K ≤M,
M
K
, K > M.
(110)
Thus, this simple scheme is optimal for K ≤M and for (K > M,N ≤ X).
Next let us consider N > X as K/M →∞. For this, let us apply the cross subspace alignment
based scheme presented in Section 5.2 with S = N −X. Note that XA = 0,XB = X, and the total
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number of downloaded q-ary symbols is NLM , so the rate achieved is
R =
H (AB | B)
NLM
(111)
=
SLM
NLM
(112)
=1−
X
N
, (113)
which matches the capacity for this setting. This completes the achievability proof of Theorem 4.
5.3.3 Achievability Proof for Theorem 5
For the cases (37), (38), let us apply the cross subspace alignment based scheme presented in Section
5.2 with S = N −X. Since XA = 0,XB = X, and the total number of downloaded q-ary symbol
is NLM , the rate achieved is
R =
H (AB)
NLM
(114)
=
SLM
NLM
(115)
= 1−
X
N
. (116)
This completes the achievability proof of Theorem 5 for the cases (37), (38).
Now consider the cases (39) and (40). For these cases, let us apply the general scheme presented
in Section 5.1. Since XA = 0,XB = X, we have
∆n =
[
αnA1 + · · ·+ α
S
nAS
αnB1 + · · ·+ α
S
nBS + α
S+1
n
∑
s∈[S]Z
′
s1 + · · ·+ α
S+X
n
∑
s∈[S]Z
′
sX
]
. (117)
Note that from the downloads ∆n of any S servers, we are able to recover the matrices A[S], so
we can eliminate the first part from the remaining N − S redundant downloads while preserving
decodability. Therefore, the total number of downloaded q-ary symbols is SLK+NKM . Thus, as
q →∞, the rate achieved is
R =
H (AB)
SLK +NKM
(118)
=
S(LK +KM −K2)
SLK +NKM
(119)
As L/M → ∞ and when M ≥ K, we have R = 1. This completes the proof of achievability of
(39). On the other hand, when M/L→∞ and K < L, we have
R =
S(LK +KM −K2)
SLK +NKM
(120)
M/L→∞
=
S
N
(121)
= 1−
X
N
(122)
This proves achievability for (40), thus completing the proof of achievability for Theorem 5.
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5.3.4 Achievability Proof of Theorem 6
Let us start with the cases (43) and (44), for which we apply the general scheme presented in
Section 5.1. Since XA = XB = X, we have
∆n =
[
αnA1 + · · ·+ α
S
nAS + α
S+1
n
∑
s∈[S]Zs1 + · · ·+ α
S+X
n
∑
s∈[S]ZsX
αnB1 + · · ·+ α
S
nBS + α
S+1
n
∑
s∈[S]Z
′
s1 + · · ·+ α
S+X
n
∑
s∈[S]Z
′
sX
]
. (123)
Now we note that since the matrices B[S] are available to user as side information, it is not necessary
to download the second part of ∆n. Therefore, the total number of downloaded q-ary symbols is
NLK, and the rate achieved is
R =
H (AB | B)
NLK
(124)
=
Smin(LK,LM)
NLK
(125)
=

1−
X
N
, K ≤M
M(N −X)
KN
, K > M
. (126)
This completes the achievability proof for cases (43) and (44).
Next, let us consider case (45), and for this setting let us apply the cross subspace alignment
based scheme presented in Section 5.2. Note that XA = XB = X, and the total number of
downloaded q-ary symbols is NLM , so the rate achieved is
R =
H (AB | B)
NLM
(127)
=
SLM
NLM
(128)
= 1−
2X
N
(129)
which matches the capacity for this setting.
5.3.5 Achievability Proof of Theorem 2
Let us start with case (26), for which we apply the cross subspace alignment based scheme that
was presented in Section 5.2. Note that XA = XB = X, and the total number of downloaded q-ary
symbols is NLM , so the rate achieved is
R =
H (AB)
NLM
(130)
=
SLM
NLM
(131)
= 1−
2X
N
, (132)
which matches the capacity for this setting.
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Next, consider case (27). For this setting, let us apply the general scheme presented in Section
5.1. Since XA = XB = X, we have
∆n =
[
αnA1 + · · ·+ α
S
nAS + α
S+1
n
∑
s∈[S]Zs1 + · · ·+ α
S+X
n
∑
s∈[S]ZsX
αnB1 + · · ·+ α
S
nBS + α
S+1
n
∑
s∈[S]Z
′
s1 + · · ·+ α
S+X
n
∑
s∈[S]Z
′
sX
]
. (133)
Thus the total number of downloaded q-ary symbols is N(LK + KM). Therefore, when K ≤
min(L,M), we have
R =
H (AB)
N(LK +KM)
(134)
=
S(LK +KM −K2)
N(LK +KM)
(135)
max(L,M)/K→∞
= 1−
X
N
. (136)
This completes the achievability proof of case (27).
5.4 Achievability Proof of Theorem 2: Case (24)
5.4.1 K = L =M = 1
Let us first consider the setting where K = L = M = 1, and let us set S = N −X. Note that in
this setting, As, Bs are independent scalars drawn uniformly from the finite field Fq. Let us first
present a solution based on the assumption that As, Bs take only non-zero values for all s ∈ [S]. It
is well-known that the multiplicative group F×q = Fq \ {0} is a cyclic group. Moreover, every finite
cyclic group of order q− 1 is isomorphic to the additive group of Z/(q− 1)Z (i.e., addition modulo
(q − 1)). Therefore it is possible to translate scalar multiplication over F×q into addition modulo
(q−1). However, the additive group of Z/(q−1)Z is not a field, and our scheme will further require
the properties of a field. This problem is circumvented by using a prime field Fp for a prime p such
that p > 2(q − 1) and noting that for any two integers a, b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q − 2}, we have
(a+ b) mod (q − 1) = ((a+ b) mod p) mod (q − 1). (137)
In other words, suppose the isomorphism between the multiplicative group F×q and the additive
group Z/(q−1)Z maps all a ∈ F×q to f(a) ∈ Z/(q−1)Z. Then for all a, b, c ∈ F
×
q such that c = a×b,
we have f(c) = f(a) + f(b) in Z/(q − 1)Z, and furthermore, under the natural interpretation of all
f(a) as elements of Fp, we have c
′ = f(a)+f(b) in Fp such that f(c) = c
′ mod (q−1). Thus, we are
able to transform the problem of scalar multiplication in F×q to scalar addition over Fp, i.e., instead
of c = a × b ∈ F×q , the user will retrieve c
′ = f(a) + f(b) ∈ Fp from which he can compute f(c)
by a mod q − 1 operation, and then from f(c) the user can compute c by inverting the isomorphic
mapping.
To account for potential zero values of As,Bs ∈ Fq, let us define f(0) = 0. In light of this
discussion, let us assume f(As), f(Bs) are scalars in Fp and the user wishes to retrieve f(As) +
f(Bs) ∈ Fp for all those s ∈ [S] where As,Bs are both non-zero, and he wishes to retrieve the
answer 0 for all those s ∈ [S] where either one of As,Bs is zero. Now let us present a scheme
to achieve this task. For this scheme let us choose p to be the minimum prime number such that
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p > 2(q − 1). Let Zsx,Z
′
sx, s ∈ [S], x ∈ [X] be uniformly distributed random (noise) scalars over
Fp. The independence of these random scalars and the scalars f(As), f(Bs) is specified as follows.
H
(
(Zsx,Z
′
sx)s∈[S],x∈[X], (f(As), f(Bs))s∈[S]
)
=
∑
s∈[S],x∈[X]
H(Zsx) +
∑
s∈[S],x∈[X]
H(Z′sx) +
∑
s∈[S]
H(f(As)) +
∑
s∈[S]
H(f(Bs)). (138)
Let αn, n ∈ [N ] be N distinct elements from Fp. The construction of A˜
n
s and B˜
n
s for any s ∈ [S]
and n ∈ [N ] is provided as follows.
A˜ns = α
s
nf(As) +
∑
x∈[X]
αS+xn Zsx (139)
= αsnf(As) + α
S+1
n Zs1 + · · ·+ α
S+X
n ZsX (140)
B˜ns = α
s
nf(Bs) +
∑
x∈[X]
αS+xn Z
′
sx (141)
= αsnf(Bs) + α
S+1
n Z
′
s1 + · · · + α
S+X
n Z
′
sX . (142)
The answer from the n-th server is obtained as follows
∆n = A˜
n
1 + · · · + A˜
n
S + B˜
n
1 + · · ·+ B˜
n
S (143)
= αn(f(A1) + f(B1)) + · · · + α
S
n(f(AS) + f(BS))
+ αS+1n
∑
s∈[S]
(Zs1 + Z
′
s1) + · · ·+ α
S+X
n
∑
s∈[S]
(ZsX + Z
′
sX). (144)
X-security is guaranteed because matrices As,Bs are protected by noise terms that are i.i.d. uni-
form and coded according to MDS(X,N) codes. Note that desired scalars and random scalars are
coded with an RS code, and S+X = N . Therefore, from the answers provided by all N servers, the
user is able to decode (As +Bs)s∈[S]. By the transformation argument, correctness is guaranteed
for all those s ∈ [S], where As 6= 0 and Bs 6= 0. However, correctness is not yet guaranteed for
those s ∈ [S] where either As = 0 or Bs = 0. For this we will implement a separate mechanism to
let the user know which As and Bs are equal to zero, so he can infer correctly that AsBs = 0 for
those instances. Specifically, for each scalar As and Bs, let us define binary symbols ηAs , ηBs that
indicate whether or not As,Bs are equal to zero. These ηAs , ηBs are also secret-shared among the
N servers in an X-secure fashion, and retrieved by the user at negligible increase in download cost
as q → ∞. Now, by the Bertrand-Chebyshev theorem, for every integer ν > 1 there is always at
least one prime p′ such that ν < p′ < 2ν, thus we must have p such that 2(q − 1) < p < 4(q − 1).
Therefore, as q →∞, the rate achieved is
R =
H (A×B)
D
(145)
≥
H (AB | B)
N logq(p) + 2SN logq(2)
(146)
≥
S( q−1q )
N logq(4(q − 1)) + 2SN logq(2)
(147)
=
(N −X)( q−1q )
N logq(4(q − 1)) + 2(N −X)N logq(2)
(148)
which approaches 1−X/N as q →∞.
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5.4.2 K = 1, Arbitrary L,M
Now let us consider the setting with arbitrary L,M , and with K = 1, i.e., the user wishes to
compute the outer product of vectors As,Bs for all s ∈ [S]. As before, let us set S = N −X, and
choose p to be the smallest prime such that p > 2(q − 1). We will allow the user to download a
normalized version of each As and Bs vector, along with the product of the normalizing factors,
from which the user can construct AsBs. To this end, let us define is, js as the index of the first
non-zero element in As,Bs, respectively, and normalize each vector As by it’s i
th
s element As(is),
each vector Bs by it’s j
th
s element Bs(js) ∀s ∈ [S]. Now ∀s ∈ [S] such that As is not the zero
vector, we have
As = As(is) [0, · · · , 0, 1, A
′
s(is + 1), . . . , A
′
s(L)]
′︸ ︷︷ ︸
A′s
, (149)
where the vector A′s is the normalized vector. Similarly, ∀s ∈ [S] such that Bs is not the zero
vector, we have
Bs = Bs(js) [0, · · · , 0, 1, B
′
s(js + 1), . . . , B
′
s(M)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
B′s
. (150)
Note that if As or Bs is the zero vector, then we simply set is = 0, js = 0 and A
′
s = 0,B
′
s = 0,
and As(is) = 1, Bs(js) = 1, respectively. The scheme is constructed as follows. Separate X-secure
secret sharing schemes are used to distribute the secrets is, js, As(is), Bs(js), A¯
′
s, B¯
′
s, among the
N servers, where A¯′s, B¯
′
s are length L − 1,M − 1 vectors respectively, obtained by eliminating
the leading 1 term from each of A′s,B
′
s (or one of the zeros if A
′
s,B
′
s are zero vectors). The
vectors A¯′s, B¯
′
s are retrieved by the user according to the scheme presented in Section 5.1, with
total download cost equal to N(L − 1) +N(M − 1) = N(L +M − 2) q-ary symbols. The indices
is, js are retrieved according to same scheme presented in Section 5.1, with total download cost not
exceeding N logq(L+1)+N logq(M +1) in units of q-ary symbols because the alphabet size for the
indices is, js is L+ 1,M + 1, respectively. The scheme presented in Section 5.4.1 is utilized by the
user to retrieve the scalar products As(is)Bs(js) with total download from N servers not exceeding
N logq(4(q − 1)). Note that since As(is)Bs(js) is always non-zero there is no need for downloading
additional indicators needed to identify zero values. The correctness follows from the fact that
As ×Bs = (As(is)Bs(js))A
′
s ×B
′
s, (151)
and by the construction of the scheme, (As(is)Bs(js)) and A
′
s ×B
′
s are recoverable for all s ∈ [S].
Therefore, the rate achieved is
R =
H
(
(As ×Bs)s∈[S]
)
D
(152)
≥
H
(
(As ×Bs)s∈[S]
)
N(L+M − 2) +N logq(L+ 1) +N logq(M + 1) +N logq(4(q − 1))
(153)
=
S(L+M − 1)
N(L+M − 2) +N logq(L+ 1) +N logq(M + 1) +N logq(4(q − 1))
(154)
=
(N −X)(L+M − 1)
N(L+M − 2) +N logq(L+ 1) +N logq(M + 1) +N logq(4(q − 1))
(155)
which approaches 1 − XN as q → ∞. This proves achievability of case (24), and completes the
achievability proof of Theorem 2.
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6 Conclusion
A class of Secure Distributed Matrix Multiplication (SDMM) problems was defined in this work,
and its capacity characterized in various parameter regimes depending on the security level X,
number of servers N , matrix dimensions L,M,K and the set of matrices that are secured or
available to the users as side-information. Notable aspects include connections between SDMM
and a form of PIR known as MM-XSTPIR that led us to various converse bounds, and cross-
subspace alignment schemes along with monomorphic transformations from scalar multiplication
to scalar addition that formed the basis of some of the achievable schemes. Note that most of
the achievable schemes in this work can also be adapted to the one-shot matrix multiplication
framework of [7, 8], say where L,K,M all approach infinity and the ratios L/K, K/M are fixed
constants. The converse parts follow directly, for the achievability parts, we can adapt our schemes
to one-shot matrix multiplication based on matrix partitioning and zero-padding. For example,
consider the cross subspace alignment based scheme in Section 5.2. Let us define L1 = ⌊L/S
′⌋S′,
where S′ = N −XA −XB . Now let us partition matrix A as follows.
A = [A1,1 . . . A1,S′ A2,1 . . . A2,(L mod S′)]
T , (156)
where (A1,s′)s∈[S′] are L1/S
′ × K matrices, (A2,s′)s∈[L mod S′] are 1 × K vectors. Now with the
schemes presented in this work, for all s′ ∈ [S′], by setting As′ = A1,s′ and Bs′ = B, one can
recover (A1,s′B)s∈[S′]. On the other hand, we can then set As′ = A2,s′ , s
′ ∈ [L mod S′], As′ =
0, s ∈ {(L mod S′) + 1, . . . , S′} and also Bs′ = B, s ∈ [S
′] to recover (A2,s′B)s∈[K mod S′]. Note
that the extra cost of zero-padding is upper bounded by KS′/LK = S′/L, which goes to zero
as L → ∞. Thus the desired rates are still achievable. In terms of future work, open problems
that merit immediate attention include the many cases of SDMM where the capacity remains
open. For example, the capacity of the basic SDMM(AB,φ) setting, previously believed to be
solved in [7] is shown to be still open in general, including the important case of square matrices
L = K = M > 1 with sufficiently many servers N > X. From the case L = K = M = 1 that
is already solved in this work, it seems that the generalization could require expanding the scope
of constructions based on non-trivial monomorphic transformations, which presents an interesting
research avenue. In terms of the connection to PIR, this work highlights the importance of finding
the capacity characterizations for MM-XSTPIR, as well as MM-XSTPC. Evidently solutions to
these PIR problems would not only add to the growing literature on PIR that already includes
many successful capacity characterizations [6, 9, 11–15], but also have a ripple effect on important
problems that are intimately connected to PIR. Similar to PIR, the models of SDMM could also be
further enriched to include privacy of retrieved information, coded storage [14,16,17], storage size
and repair constraints [18–20] and generalized forms of side-information [21–23]. Thus, just like
PIR, SDMM offers a fertile research landscape for discovering new coding structures and converse
arguments.
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A Multi-Message X-Secure T -Private Information Retrieval
A.1 Problem Statement
ConsiderK messages stored atN distributed servers,W1,W2, . . . ,WK . Each message is represented
by L random symbols from the finite field Fq.
H(W1) = H(W2) = · · · = H(WK) = L, (157)
H(W[K]) = KL, (158)
in q-ary units. The information stored at the n-th server is denoted by Sn, n ∈ [N ]. X-secure
storage, 0 ≤ X ≤ N , guarantees that any X (or fewer) colluding servers learns nothing about
messages.
I(SX ;W[K]) = 0, ∀X ⊂ [N ], |X | = X. (159)
To make information retrieval possible, messages must be function of S[N ].
H(W[K]|S[N ]) = 0. (160)
The multi-message T -private information retrieval allows the user to retrieve M messages simul-
taneously. The user privately and uniformly generate a set of indices of desired messages K,
K ⊂ [K], |K| =M . To retrieve desired messages privately, the user generates N queries QK[N ]. The
n-th query QKn is sent to the n-th server. The user has no prior knowledge of information stored
at servers, i.e.,
I(S[N ];K, Q
K
[N ]) = 0. (161)
T -privacy, 0 ≤ T ≤ N , guarantees that any T (or fewer) colluding servers learns nothing about K.
I(QKT , ST ;K) = 0, ∀T ⊂ [N ], |T | = T. (162)
Upon receiving user’s query QKn , the n-th server responds user with an answer A
K
n , which is function
of the query and its storage, i.e.,
H(AKn |Q
K
n , Sn) = 0. (163)
The user must be able to recover desired messages WK from all answers A
K
[N ].
H(WK|A
K
[N ], Q
K
[N ],K) = 0. (164)
The rate of a multi-message XSTPIR scheme is defined by the number of q-ary symbols of desired
messages that are retrieved per downloaded q-ary symbol,
R =
H(WK)∑
n∈[N ]A
K
n
=
ML
D
. (165)
D =
∑
n∈[N ]A
K
n is expected number of downloaded q-ary symbols from all servers. The ca-
pacity of multi-message XSTPIR is the supremum of rate over all feasible schemes, denoted as
CMM-XSTPIR(N,X, T,K,M).
Note that setting X = 0 reduces the problem to basic multi-message T -private information
retrieval where storage is not secure. The setting T = 0 reduces the problem to X-secure storage
with no privacy constraint.
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A.2 Upper Bound of the Capacity of Multi-Message XSTPIR
To prove Theorem 1, we need following lemmas.
Lemma 4. For all K,K′ ⊂ [K], |K| = |K′| =M , ∀T ⊂ [N ], |T | = T , we have(
QKT , A
K
T , S[N ],W[K]
)
∼
(
QK
′
T , A
K′
T , S[N ],W[K]
)
(166)
Proof. It suffices to prove I
(
QKT , A
K
T , S[N ],W[K];K
)
= 0. The proof is presented as follows.
I
(
QKT , A
K
T , S[N ],W[K];K
)
(167)
=I(QKT ;K) + I(S[N ],W[K];K|Q
K
T ) + I(A
K
T ;K|Q
K
T , S[N ],W[K]) (168)
=I(QKT ;K) + I(S[N ],W[K];K|Q
K
T ) (169)
=I(QKT ;K) + I(S[N ];K|Q
K
T ) (170)
≤I(QKT ;K) + I(S[N ];K, Q
K
T ) (171)
=0. (172)
Steps are justified as follows. (168) is the chain rule of mutual information. (169) holds from the fact
that AKT is function of (Q
K
T , S[N ]) according to (163). (170) follows becauseW[K] is function of S[N ],
according to (160). (171) follows from the chain rule and non-negativity of mutual information. In
last step, we simply used (161) and (162). This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. For all T ,X ⊂ [N ], |T | = T, |X | = X, ∀K,K′ ⊂ [K], |K| = |K′| = M , ∀κ ⊂ [K], we
have
H(AKT |SX , Q
K
[N ],Wκ) = H(A
K
T |SX , Q
K
T ,Wκ). (173)
Proof.
H(AKT |SX , Q
K
T ,Wκ)−H(A
K
T |SX , Q
K
[N ],Wκ) (174)
= I(AKT ;Q
K
[N ]|SX , Q
K
T ,Wκ) (175)
≤ I(AKT , SX ,Wκ;Q
K
[N ]|Q
K
T ) (176)
≤ I(AKT , S[N ],Wκ;Q
K
[N ]|Q
K
T ) (177)
= I(AKT , S[N ];Q
K
[N ]|Q
K
T ) (178)
= I(S[N ];Q
K
[N ]|Q
K
T ) + I(A
K
T ;Q
K
[N ]|Q
K
T , S[N ]) (179)
= I(S[N ];Q
K
[N ]|Q
K
T ) (180)
≤ I(S[N ];Q
K
[N ]) (181)
= 0. (182)
Steps are justified as follows. (175) is the definition of mutual information. (176) follows from
the chain rule and non-negativity of mutual information. In (177), we added terms in mutual
information. (178) holds from the fact that W[K] is function of S[N ], according to (160). (179)
is the chain rule of mutual information. (180) follows from the fact that AKT is fully determined
by (QKT , S[N ]) according to (163). (181) follows from the chain rule and non-negativity of mutual
information, while the last step holds from (161). This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
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Lemma 6. Denote Dn the expected number of q-ary symbols downloaded from the n-th server. For
all X ⊂ [N ], |X | = X, X = [N ] \ X , ∀K1 ⊂ [K], |K1| =M , we have
ML ≤
∑
n∈X
Dn −H(A
K1
X
|SX , Q
K1
[N ],WK1). (183)
Proof.
ML = H(WK1) = I(WK1 ;A
K1
[N ]|Q
K1
[N ]) (184)
≤ I(WK1 ;A
K1
[N ], SX |Q
K1
[N ]) (185)
= I(WK1 ;SX |Q
K1
[N ]) + I(WK1 ;A
K1
[N ]|SX , Q
K1
[N ]) (186)
≤ I(WK1 , Q
K1
[N ]
;SX ) + I(WK1 ;A
K1
[N ]
|SX , Q
K1
[N ]
) (187)
= I(WK1 ;SX ) + I(Q
K1
[N ];SX |WK1) + I(WK1 ;A
K1
[N ]|SX , Q
K1
[N ]) (188)
≤ I(QK1[N ];WK1 , SX ) + I(WK1 ;A
K1
[N ]|SX , Q
K1
[N ]) (189)
= I(WK1 ;A
K1
X , A
K1
X
|SX , Q
K1
[N ]) (190)
= I(WK1 ;A
K1
X
|SX , Q
K1
[N ]) (191)
= H(AK1
X
|SX , Q
K1
[N ])−H(A
K1
X
|WK1 , SX , Q
K1
[N ]) (192)
≤
∑
n∈X
Dn −H(A
K1
X
|SX , Q
K1
[N ],WK1). (193)
Steps are justified as follows. (184) follows from (164), while in (185), we add terms in mutual
information. In (186), (187), (188) and (189), we repeatedly used the chain rule and non-negativity
of mutual information, while (189) and (190) holds from the independence of query and storage,
according to (161). (191) holds from the fact that AK1X is fully determined by (Q
K1
[N ], SX ) according
to (163). (192) is the definition of mutual information, while (193) follows from the fact that
dropping conditions can not reduce entropy. This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
Lemma 7. For all X ⊂ [N ], |X | = X, ∀K ⊂ [K], |K| =M , ∀κ ⊂ [K], we have
I(WK;SX , Q
K
[N ],Wκ) = |K ∩ κ|L. (194)
Proof.
I(WK;SX , Q
K
[N ],Wκ)
= I(WK;Wκ) + I(WK;SX , Q
K
[N ]|Wκ) (195)
= |K ∩ κ|L+ I(WK;SX , Q
K
[N ]|Wκ). (196)
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(195) is the chain rule of mutual information, and (196) follows from (157) and (158). Let us
consider the RHS term, we have
I(WK;SX , Q
K
[N ]|Wκ)
≤ I(SX , Q
K
[N ];WK,Wκ) (197)
= I(SX ;WK,Wκ) + I(Q
K
[N ];WK,Wκ|SX ) (198)
= I(QK[N ];WK,Wκ|SX ) (199)
≤ I(QK[N ];WK,Wκ, SX ) (200)
≤ I(QK[N ];S[N ]) (201)
= 0. (202)
Steps are justified as follows. (197) and (198) follows from the chain rule and non-negativity of
mutual information, while (199) follows from the X-secure constraint in (159). (200) holds from
the chain rule and non-negativity of mutual information, and (201) follows from the fact that
(WK,Wκ, SX ) is function of S[N ]. The last step follows from (161). This completes the proof of
Lemma 7.
Now we are ready to formally present the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. First, let us consider X < N ≤ X + T . For this setting, let us assume that Ki = [i :
i+M − 1], i ∈ [K −M + 1]. Note that by the selection of Ki’s, ∀i ∈ [K −M ], we have
|Ki+1 ∩ (K1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ki)| = (M − 1). (203)
Now let us consider the RHS term in (193). For all i ∈ [K −M ], we have
H(AKi
X
|SX , Q
Ki
[N ],WK1∪···∪Ki)
= H(AKi
X
|SX , Q
Ki
X
,WK1∪···∪Ki) (204)
= H(A
Ki+1
X
|SX , Q
Ki+1
X
,WK1∪···∪Ki) (205)
= H(A
Ki+1
X
|SX , Q
Ki+1
[N ] ,WK1∪···∪Ki) (206)
= H(WKi+1 , A
Ki+1
X
|SX , Q
Ki+1
[N ] ,WK1∪···∪Ki) (207)
= H(WKi+1 |SX , Q
Ki+1
[N ] ,WK1∪···∪Ki) +H(A
Ki+1
X
|SX , Q
Ki+1
[N ] ,WK1∪···∪Ki+1) (208)
= L+H(A
Ki+1
X
|SX , Q
Ki+1
[N ] ,WK1∪···∪Ki+1). (209)
Steps are justified as follows. (204) follows from Lemma 5, while (205) follows from Lemma 4.
(206) again follows from Lemma 5. (207) follows from (163) and (164). (208) is the chain rule
of entropy, while the last step follows from Lemma 7 and (203). Applying (209) repeatedly for
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i = 1, 2, . . . ,K −M , we have
ML ≤
∑
n∈X
Dn −H(A
K1
X
|SX , Q
K1
[N ],WK1) (210)
=
∑
n∈X
Dn − L−H(A
K2
X
|SX , Q
K2
[N ],WK1∪K2) (211)
= · · · (212)
=
∑
n∈X
Dn − (K −M)L. (213)
Averaging over all X , we have
D =
∑
n∈[N ]
Dn ≥
N
N −X
KL. (214)
Therefore we have
R =
ML
D
≤
M(N −X)
KN
. (215)
Thus
CMM-XSTPIR(N,X, T,K,M) ≤
M(N −X)
KN
, X < N ≤ X + T. (216)
Next, let us consider N > X + T . For this setting, let us assume that Ki = {M(i − 1) + 1,M(i −
1) + 2, . . . ,Mi}, ∀i ∈ [⌊KM ⌋]. Note that Ki’s are disjoint sets. Similarly, let us consider the RHS
term in (193). Consider any set T ⊂ X , |T | = T , For all i, i+ 1 ∈ [⌊KM ⌋], we have
H(AKi
X
|SX , Q
Ki
[N ],WK1∪···∪Ki)
≥ H(AKiT |SX , Q
Ki
[N ],WK1∪···∪Ki) (217)
= H(AKiT |SX , Q
Ki
T ,WK1∪···∪Ki) (218)
= H(A
Ki+1
T |SX , Q
Ki+1
T ,WK1∪···∪Ki) (219)
= H(A
Ki+1
T |SX , Q
Ki+1
[N ] ,WK1∪···∪Ki). (220)
Steps are justified as follows. (217) follows from the fact that dropping terms can not increase
entropy. (218) follows from Lemma 5. (219) follows from Lemma 4, while (220) again follows from
Lemma 5. Now let us average (220) over all T and apply Han’s inequality.
H(AKi
X
|SX , Q
Ki
[N ],WK1∪···∪Ki)
≥
T
N −X
H(A
Ki+1
X
|SX , Q
Ki+1
[N ] ,WK1∪···∪Ki) (221)
=
T
N −X
H(WKi+1 , A
Ki+1
X
|SX , Q
Ki+1
[N ] ,WK1∪···∪Ki) (222)
=
T
N −X
(
H(WKi+1 |SX , Q
Ki+1
[N ] ,WK1∪···∪Ki) +H(A
Ki+1
X
|SX , Q
Ki+1
[N ] ,WK1∪···∪Ki+1)
)
(223)
=
T
N −X
(
ML+H(A
Ki+1
X
|SX , Q
Ki+1
[N ] ,WK1∪···∪Ki+1)
)
. (224)
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(221) follows from the Han’s inequality, and (222) follows from (163) and (164). (222) is the chain
rule of entropy, while the last step holds from Lemma 7 and the fact that Ki’s are disjoint sets.
Now let us apply (224) repeatedly for i = 1, 2, . . . , ⌊KM ⌋ − 1, we have
ML ≤
∑
n∈X
Dn −H(A
K1
X
|SX , Q
K1
[N ],WK1) (225)
≤
∑
n∈X
Dn −
T
N −X
(
ML+H(AK2
X
|SX , Q
K2
[N ],WK1∪K2)
)
(226)
≤ . . . (227)
≤
∑
n∈X
Dn −ML
((
T
N −X
)
+ · · ·+
(
T
N −X
)⌊K
M
⌋−1
)
. (228)
Thus we have
∑
n∈X
Dn ≥ML
(
1 +
(
T
N −X
)
+ · · ·+
(
T
N −X
)⌊K
M
⌋−1
)
. (229)
Averaging over all X , we have
D =
∑
n∈[N ]
Dn ≥ML
N
N −X
(
1 +
(
T
N −X
)
+ · · ·+
(
T
N −X
)⌊K
M
⌋−1
)
. (230)
Therefore,
R =
ML
D
≤
N −X
N
(
1 +
(
T
N −X
)
+ · · ·+
(
T
N −X
)⌊K
M
⌋−1
)−1
. (231)
So we have,
CMM-XSTPIR(N,X, T,K,M)
≤
N −X
N
(
1 +
(
T
N −X
)
+ · · · +
(
T
N −X
)⌊K
M
⌋−1
)−1
, N > X + T. (232)
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 1: Note that when X = 0, i.e., the basic multi-message T -private information retrieval
problem where storage is not secure, the proof of Theorem 1 follows directly, and the resulting
upper bound is obtained by setting X = 0.
Remark 2: Note that when T = 0, i.e., the problem with X-secure storage and no privacy
requirement, we have
CMM-XSTPIR(N,X, T = 0,K,M)
≤

0, N ≤ X,
N −X
N
, N > X.
(233)
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B Proof of Lemma 2
To prove Lemma 2, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 8. For independent random matrices A¯ ∈ Fl×kq , B¯ ∈ F
k×k
q , if the elements of B¯ are i.i.d.
uniform then
lim
q→∞
H(A¯B¯ | B¯) = H(A¯) (234)
in q-ary units.
Proof. Define σ as 0 if B¯ is singular, and 1 otherwise. Then we have
H(A¯B¯ | B¯) = H(A¯B¯ | B¯, σ) (235)
= H(A¯B¯ | B¯, σ = 1)P (σ = 1) +H(A¯B¯ | B¯, σ = 0)P (σ = 0) (236)
= H(A¯ | B¯, σ = 1)P (σ = 1) +H(A¯B¯ | B¯, σ = 0)P (σ = 0) (237)
= H(A¯)P (σ = 1) +H(A¯B¯ | B¯, σ = 0)P (σ = 0) (238)
= H(A¯)
k∏
i=1
(1− q−i) +H(A¯B¯ | B¯, σ = 0)
(
1−
k∏
i=1
(1− q−i)
)
(239)
In (237) we used the fact that given a square non-singular (invertible) matrix B¯, the matrix A¯B¯ is
an invertible function of the matrix A¯. In (239) we used the result from [24] that the probability
of a matrix B¯ drawn uniformly from Fk×kq being singular is exactly 1−
∏k
i=1(1− q
−1). Now, since
H(A¯B¯ | B¯, σ = 0) is a finite value bounded between 0 and lk, as q → ∞ we have H(A¯B¯ | B¯) =
H(A¯).
The random matrices A,B in the next two lemmas are as defined in Lemma 2. Note that we
assume that q →∞ throughout the remainder of this section.
Lemma 9. When K ≥M , let us express A as
A = [ (A1)L×M︸ ︷︷ ︸
First M columns
| (A2)L×(K−M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Last K −M columns
]. (240)
Similarly, let us express B as
B =
[
(B1)M×M
(B2)(K−M)×M
]
}First M rows
}Last K −M rows.
(241)
Then we have
H(AB | B1,B2,A2) = H(A1). (242)
Proof. As q →∞, the square matrix B1 is invertible with probability 1. Therefore, using Lemma
8, H(AB | B1,B2,A2) = H(A1B1,A1B2,A2B1,A2B2 | B1,B2,A2) = H(A1B1,A1B2 |
B1,B2,A2) = H(A1,A1B2 | B1,B2,A2) = H(A1 | B1,B2,A2) = H(A1).
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Lemma 10. When K < M , let us express B as
B = [ (B1)K×K︸ ︷︷ ︸
First K columns
| (B2)K×(M−K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Last M −K columns
]. (243)
Then we have
H(AB | B1,B2) = H(A). (244)
In particular, when K < L, we have
H(AB | B1) = H(A) +H(B2). (245)
Proof. As q → ∞, the square matrix B1 is invertible with probability 1. Therefore, H(AB |
B1,B2) = H(AB1,AB2 | B1,B2) = H(A,AB2 | B1,B2) = H(A | B1,B2) = H(A). When
K < L, the matrix A has full column rank with probability 1, so that given A, the matrix B2 is an
invertible function of AB2. Therefore, H(AB | B1) = H(AB1,AB2 | B1) = H(A,AB2 | B1) =
H(A | B1) +H(AB2 | B1,A) = H(A | B1) +H(B2 | B1,A) = H(A) +H(B2).
Now we are ready to prove the first part of Lemma 2.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2: (20)
Proof. Case 1. K ≤ min(L,M).
First, let us consider the upper bound. Note that we can rewrite matrix A as
A =
[
(A1)K×K
(A2)(L−K)×K
]
}First K rows
}Last L−K rows.
(246)
Similarly, let us rewrite matrix B as
B = [ (B1)K×K︸ ︷︷ ︸
First K columns
| (B2)K×(M−K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Last M −K columns
]. (247)
Note that as q →∞, square matrices A1 and B1 are invertible with probability 1. Thus we have
A =
[
IK
A2A
−1
1
]
A1, (248)
B = B1
[
IK | B
−1
1 B2
]
. (249)
Therefore,
AB =
[
IK
A2A
−1
1
]
(A1B1)
[
IK |B
−1
1 B2
]
. (250)
Then we have
H(AB) ≤ H(A2A
−1
1 ,A1B1,B
−1
1 B2) (251)
≤ K(L−K) +K2 +K(M −K) (252)
= LK +KM −K2, (253)
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in q-ary units. On the other hand, from (245) of Lemma 10, we have
H(AB) ≥H(AB | B1) (254)
=H(A) +H(B2) (255)
=LK +KM −K2, (256)
in q-ary units. This completes the proof of (20) for Case 1.
Case 2. M ≤ min(L,K).
Let us consider the upper bound first. Since AB has dimension L × M , it is trivial that
H(AB) ≤ LM in q-ary units. On the other hand, from Lemma 9, we have H(AB) ≥ H(AB |
B1,B2,A2) = H(A1) = LM in q-ary units. This completes the proof of (20) for Case 2.
Case 3. L ≤ min(K,M). By symmetry this case is identical to Case 2. This completes the
proof of (20) for Lemma 2.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2: (21),(22)
First let us prove that H(AB | B) = min(LM,LK). If K ≤ M , then from (244) of Lemma
10, we have H(A × B | B) = H(A) = LK in q-ary units. Now consider K > M . We have
H(AB | B) ≤ H(AB) = LM , in q-ary units. On the other hand, from Lemma 9, we have
H(A × B | B) = H(A × B | B1,B2) ≥ H(A × B | B1,B2,A2) = H(A1) = LM in q-ary units.
By symmetry, H(A × B|A) = min(LM,KM) can be similarly proved. This completes the proof
of Lemma 2.
C Invertibility of MN
Lemma 11. The matrix MN is invertible if f[S] are S distinct elements from Fq and α[N ] are N
distinct elements from G,
G = {α ∈ Fq : α+ fs 6= 0,∀s ∈ [S]}. (257)
Proof. Proof of Lemma 11 is almost identical to that of Lemma 5 in [6]. The only difference is that
since f[S] are distinct S elements from Fq, (117) in [6] becomes
g(α) =
S∑
i=1
ci
(
∆
fi + α
)
. (258)
Now choosing α such that (fi + α) = 0 gives us c1 = · · · = cS = 0. Other parts of the proof in [6]
apply directly. This completes the proof of Lemma 11.
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